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former British Protectorate until 1960, Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence from the rest of the Somali Republic in 1991 after the Somali National Movement overthrew the virulent Siad Barre regime in Mogadishu.

While Somalia has grappled with its ‘failed state’ status and descended into a ‘Paradise Lost’ of inter-clan fighting, warlords, gun-smugglers, pirates and extremists, Somaliland has established a unique, hybrid, bicameral system of government that combines an 82-seat elected parliament and an 82-seat House of Elders (the Guurti) consisting of traditional clan leaders.

Following a plebiscite on a constitution in 2001 and a succession of elections between 2002 and 2005, Somaliland established a constitutional, multiparty democracy to become a political rarity in the Horn of Africa.

Aside from the relative success of its democratic transition, Somaliland has a solid legal basis for its claims to sovereignty. Between 26 June and 1 July 1960, Somaliland enjoyed a brief flirtation with independence before voluntarily entering into a union with the former Italian colony of Somalia to the south. Article 4(b) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union “respect[s] borders existing on achievement of independence.”

Somaliland’s mere five-day sojourn with statehood does not diminish its claims to sovereignty during that period, and, as Ibrahim Hassan Gagale told ISN Security Watch, “the failure of the union [with Somalia] does not alter or change the [right] of Somaliland [to claim] legitimate borders, independence and diplomatic recognition.”

For now, Somaliland’s diplomatic charms have been unsuccessful. Foreign elites have supported the sovereignty claims of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, a nominal representation of Somali political power established in 2004 that survives on international nourishment and a fluid system of horse-trading and clan alliances in the south.

Internal flashpoint

Recently, Somaliland has faced up to an internal crisis of its own making. Growing apathy toward the rule of the Unity of Democrats Party (UDUP) and President Dahir Rayale Kahin stirred anti-government sentiment and an ongoing dispute over voter lists turned into a flashpoint for political tension across the territory.

The dispute began in April 2008 when presidential elections were postponed for one year to enable the completion of a computerized voter list. Rayale successfully petitioned the Guurti to extend his mandate to cover the period before the election.

As the list remained unfinished in April 2009, the Guurti extended Rayale’s mandate for a further six months. However, in July, Rayale and the National Electoral Commission (NEC) announced their rejection of the computerized list, saying that server problems had compromised the integrity of the register and that elections would proceed as scheduled on 27 September without a registered electorate.

In response, the two opposition parties - Solidarity (Kulmiye) and Justice and Welfare Party (UCID) - already incensed by the continued term extensions and restriction of political freedoms under Rayale’s government, announced they would boycott elections held on Rayale’s terms.

In early September, opposition members motioned to impeach Rayale on the grounds that his rejection of the voter list was unconstitutional. When the motion was brought up for debate, parliamentarians started fist-fighting and, in a bizarre twist, the police forces confiscated the keys to the premises and ordered the speaker and the MPs to leave the parliamentary compound.

When it became clear that the elections would be postponed for a third time, a mass of opposition supporters surrounded the parliament and, on 12 September, the police used live ammunition to suppress the crowd, leaving three demonstrators dead and another six injured.

With Somaliland peering into a political unknown, the Guurti moved quickly to broker a deal between the political parties. On 25 September, they announced an agreement that establishes a new NEC, and expedites the creation of a voter registration list and outlaws presidential term extensions without the consent of opposition parties. Analysts believe that a presidential election could take place in January 2010 at the earliest.

While democracy in action earned its stripes, the census issue remains. The socio-political governance structure is in part derived from a clan-based representation system, so any estimation of numbers carries additional power.

Michael Walls of Somaliland Focus (UK) told ISN Security Watch that the list represented the first attempt by the government to establish “a concrete measure of clan populations, and therefore of political weight […] [and may] be the source of serious disagreement in the near future.”

Democracy, development and recognition

Leaders in Somaliland are mindful that their relative stability sets them apart from the rest of Somalia and are keen to portray the recent flare up as merely a challenge to their democratic credentials.

“Sometimes two brothers fight, but at the end of the day, they are friends,” Abdilaziz Samaleh, an MP, told The National. “We are glad we have opposition parties that can demonstrate an opinion. We think we are a good example for our neighbors in Africa.”

Indeed, democratic stability forms the cornerstone of Somaliland’s foreign policy.

“The late president [Muhammad Haji Ibrahim] Egal declared in 1999 that the introduction of multi-party democracy would underpin efforts to achieve international recognition,” Walls told ISN Security Watch. “Democracy is not a prerequisite for recognition anywhere else, but it has effectively become closely linked in the case of Somaliland, both for those inside the country and for the international diplomatic community.”

Both of Rayale’s opponents in the presidential elections, Kulmiye’s Ahmed Mohamed Mahamoud and UCID’s Faisal Ali Warabe, have stated that recognition of Somaliland sovereignty is the primary goal of government. But whether the political class seeks genuine democratic participation or merely the trappings of international statehood remains unclear.

Walls, who was part of the international observer mission for the aborted presidential elections, argues that “the pursuit of democracy is seen by many in Somaliland simply as an instrumental element in the quest for recognition, possibly with the effect that democracy is undervalued as an end in itself.”

A major sticking point is that Somaliland may have reached a stage in democratic development where its aspirations for statehood must coincide with real developments, but which are impeded while it remains stranded in the international wilderness.

Due to its ‘non-state’ status, Somaliland cannot appeal for aid from global financial institutions or conduct any formal trade with other nations. The economy is supported by livestock exports, primarily to the Arabian Peninsula, and remittances from the diaspora. In addition, its close proximity to Somalia significantly hampers opportunities to attract foreign investment.

While the US and, particularly, the UK, are sympathetic to the aims of Somaliland, they have explicitly stated that the issue of territorial integrity in Africa is a matter exclusively for the African Union. For now, Africa’s intergovernmental organization is loath to contribute to the myriad problems facing the Somali transitional government, and Somaliland will continue to be seen within the prism of non-existent state-building in Somalia.

This is their catch-22: While Somaliland is a political and institutional reality, its development and aspirations to statehood remain hostage to the spiral of violence in the south and the diplomatic whims of capitals elsewhere